Extended Abstract

Objective

Integrated Pest Management (IPM) is widely recognized as one of the most important ecological approaches for reducing pesticide dependency and promoting sustainable agriculture. However, in agricultural systems characterized by fragmented landholdings and ecological interdependence among farms, the successful implementation of IPM depends largely on collective action among farmers. In wheat farming systems, pest populations move continuously across neighboring fields, meaning that individual pest control efforts cannot ensure sustainable outcomes unless they are coordinated collectively. Consequently, pest management becomes a collective governance issue rather than merely an individual technical practice. Despite the expansion of extension programs and increasing awareness regarding sustainable agriculture, collective implementation of IPM among Iranian wheat farmers remains weak.

Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework emphasizes that collective action is shaped within the “action situation,” where actors make decisions under specific institutional, informational, and socio-economic conditions. In the context of IPM, the action situation refers to the arena in which farmers evaluate costs, benefits, risks, trust, institutional support, and the expected behaviors of other farmers before deciding whether to participate in collective pest management activities. Nevertheless, most previous studies have mainly focused on individual adoption of agricultural technologies, technical barriers, or economic factors, while limited attention has been paid to the institutional and social barriers embedded within the action situation itself. Therefore, this study aimed to identify and analyze the barriers to collective action within the action situation of IPM implementation among wheat farmers in Kermanshah County, Iran.

Methods

This study employed a qualitative exploratory research design grounded in Ostrom’s collective action theory and the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. The study population consisted of wheat farmers in Kermanshah County, one of the major wheat-producing regions in western Iran. Participants were selected through purposive sampling using a maximum variation strategy to ensure diversity in farming systems, farm size, educational background, and farming experience. Sampling continued until theoretical saturation was achieved, resulting in 20 in-depth semi-structured interviews with wheat farmers. Data collection focused on farmers’ experiences and perceptions regarding barriers to collective IPM implementation. Each interview lasted approximately 70–90 minutes and was audio-recorded with participants’ informed consent. Data analysis was conducted using thematic analysis supported by MAXQDA2020 software. Interview transcripts were coded through open, axial, and selective coding procedures to identify major themes and relationships among categories. To ensure trustworthiness, Lincoln and Guba’s criteria, including credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability, were applied through member checking, detailed contextual descriptions, systematic documentation, and the use of direct quotations from participants.

Results and Discussion

The findings revealed that barriers to collective implementation of IPM are deeply embedded within the structure of the action situation and can be categorized into six interrelated dimensions. The first category involved informational barriers. Farmers reported limited access to timely and reliable information regarding pest outbreaks, IPM techniques, and coordinated management practices. Weak extension services, poor communication among farmers, and low trust in official information sources reduced knowledge exchange and created uncertainty about collective participation. In many cases, farmers relied on informal experiences or individual judgments rather than coordinated information systems.

The second category included action-related barriers. Farmers emphasized the lack of organized collective planning, weak coordination mechanisms, insufficient financial resources, and resistance to adopting new pest management methods. Although many participants acknowledged the importance of collective pest control, they believed that the absence of clear operational arrangements prevented effective cooperation.

Actor-related barriers constituted another important challenge. Participants referred to weak mutual trust, differences in knowledge and attitudes, unequal influence among farmers, poor teamwork skills, and excessive dependence on government institutions. Concerns regarding free-riding behavior were repeatedly mentioned, as many farmers feared that some individuals would benefit from collective pest control efforts without contributing themselves. Such perceptions weakened motivation for cooperation and reinforced individualistic behavior.

Cost-benefit barriers also significantly constrained collective action. Farmers perceived IPM implementation as costly, risky, and uncertain in the short term. They highlighted high initial expenses, lack of financial support, and unequal distribution of costs and benefits among participants. Because the long-term ecological and economic benefits of IPM were often uncertain or difficult to observe, many farmers preferred immediate and familiar chemical control methods.

Monitoring and control barriers included the absence of continuous supervision, limited accountability mechanisms, shortage of trained experts, and inadequate institutional support. Farmers argued that without effective monitoring systems, there was no guarantee that all participants would fulfill their commitments, which further reduced trust and willingness to cooperate.

The findings derived from the interpretive theme relationship matrix revealed that the barriers to collective action operate as a multi-layered causal network rather than following a linear pattern. Within this network, information-related barriers create uncertainty and undermine shared understanding, thereby laying the foundation for distrust among farmers. Actor-related barriers subsequently translate these conditions into reduced coordination, weakened mutual trust, and limited collective cooperation. At the same time, cost–benefit barriers and unfavorable perceptions of potential outcomes diminish farmers' motivation to engage in coordinated action, while weak monitoring and control mechanisms reinforce this cycle by reducing accountability and encouraging opportunistic behavior and free-riding. Overall, the findings demonstrate that the failure of collective action in integrated pest management is not attributable to a single factor but rather emerges from the simultaneous interaction of institutional, social, economic, and cognitive barriers within the focal action situation.

Conclusion

The failure of collective action in integrated pest management cannot be attributed solely to a lack of technical knowledge or individual resistance to new technologies. Rather, this failure results from the emergence of an ineffective focal action situation in which weak information flows, declining trust, power asymmetries, high risk perceptions, and inadequate monitoring mechanisms mutually reinforce one another. Therefore, the fundamental challenge in implementing IPM is not its cognitive acceptance among farmers, but rather its social feasibility within the network of relationships among actors. In other words, although farmers recognize the importance and necessity of reducing pesticide use and acknowledge the potential benefits of integrated pest management, transforming this individual awareness into coordinated collective action requires the presence of appropriate institutional, informational, and social conditions that are constructed within the focal action situation.